So What?
Pointless stories are met with the withering rejoinder,
"So what?"
Every good narrator is continually warding off this question;
when his narrative is over it should be unthinkable
for a bystander to say, "So what?"
William Labov 78
Over three decades ago, Justice William Brennan proclaimed the "central meaning of the First Amendment." 79 It was an affirmation of Madisonian principles. 80 However glorious, that moment was shortlived; for never once has the Court again invoked Brennan's famous declaration. Nor has the Court since paid much but idle lipservice to traditional Madisonian ideals. Apparently, the Court has no coherent theory, only casebycase "balancing" and everchanging legal doctrines. This is predictable. The postmodern First Amendment has no central meaning. It defies meaning to the point that it means nearly all things to all people. Broadly understood, expression is heralded as an end in itself. Free speech values, like a faith in reason, have become passe.
This is the regime of First Amendment myths and narrative truths. In this realm, there are no Madisonian truths, no Enlightenment realities, and no noble lies. There are mainly stories about contingent truths, virtual realities, and aesthetic tastes. Thus, Alexander Bickel's protest that "total relativism . . . cannot be the theory of our Constitution" 81 is likely to be met with the rejoinder, "So what?"
By contrast, when the narrators of liberal democracy paint a patina of respectability on the excesses of an unrespectable state, they cannot reasonably hope to redirect our commercial entertainment culture. The divide between ennobling First Amendment narratives and ignoble free speech practices may already be too wide to cross. Thus, the pragmaticallyminded Bickel would likely counter such romantic stories with the rejoinder, "So what?"
We now take leave, very grateful to our colleagues in this Symposium for engaging us after The Death of Discourse. If we meet again, may our discourse be as lively. 82