The Great Divide
An epoch approaches its end when its fundamental conviction
begins to weaken
and no longer inspires enthusiasm among its advocates.
Albert Borgmann 26
The Death of Discourse recognizes a phenomenon akin to the free speech narratives discussed by some of our colleagues. It points to this phenomenon, not so much as a philosophical matter, but more so as a socioeconomic cultural matter. Hence, in the mass commercial entertainment culture, "truth is irrelevant," " ' [t]ruth is what sells,' " " [t]here is no test of truth," and " [t]ruth is what you want people to believe." 27 In fact, commercial narratives draw much of their bloodflow from postmodern attitudes toward truth and lying. Men wear shirts and feel like daisies; liberation comes to women who puff cigarettes; chemical and gas companies console us with promotional visions of snowcapped mountains and green fields. These are the narratives of We the People, not those heroic narratives told by the elitist conservators of the First Amendment.
None of our colleagues is willing to champion these narratives of the capitalist marketplace. They agree, explicitly or sub silentio, that there is an immense gap between Madisonian First Amendment "ideals" and many modern free speech practices. 28 But that gap is obfuscated when several of our colleagues engage in motivational analysis. That is, they are less concerned with the dissonance between First Amendment "ideals" and cultural practices than they are with the intentions of those who rationalize that dissonance. For us, the focus turns 180 degreesthis notwithstanding our bold claims about "deliberate lies" and our tentative speculations about those who advance such "lies." 29 However informative a discussion of the spectrum of volitional untruths, is it not more fruitful to examine the high against the low, rather than to fix on perplexities akin to criminal culpability under the Model Penal Code?
Let us offer one preliminary answer to our question. The greater the divide between Madisonian ideals and commercial entertainment realities, the more muted is the voice of those ideals. Though ideals by definition presuppose some discrepancy between the aspirational and the actual, no First Amendment narrative can tolerate a span so wide as to erode belief in its ideals. A culture's noble free speech theory loses its staying power if it is no longer likely to be believed. Ultimately, to remain functional, a Madisonian myth (or any ennobling narrative) must be a likely object of trust.
The viability of any Madisonian myth, of course, is fundamentally what we question in the Epilogue of The Death of Discourse. We ask whether the First Amendment ideals espoused by courts and commentatorsthe stuff of which "noble lies" or "cultural myths and narratives" are madeare or could really be shared societal values. To that end, our "cultural approach" abandons (though at no little cost) the old ideals in the name of new realities. But why? Our reply has everything to do with what Professor Nyberg appropriately calls "pragmatic language" 30 That is, what real chance do Madisonian principles or elevated narratives stand in a carnival culture? In the end, however, Professor Nyberg's own "pragmatic" argument proves unresponsive. It is one that sounds "too ideal," 31 and extends little beyond Echoing narratives "over and over" 32 and over and over and over . . . .