A Model Supreme Court Opinion on First Amendment Narratives

Ponder this: "Man has to choose between peace of mind deriving from a pleasing delusion and peace of mind deriving from the unpleasing truth." 42

Without shrugging off the Enlightenment's values, our postmodern free speech narrators have chosen the uneasy position of owning mythic hypocrisy that cannot be revealed­at least not too often or too openly. Political pragmatism would appear to dictate that our narrators hide behind a curtain as opaque as the one that concealed the pitiful wizard in the Land of Oz. 43 In more familiar free speech territory, exactly how candid can our narrative conservators of the First Amendment be when it comes to the tales they tell? Consider, for example, an imaginary opinion of the United States Supreme Court. A portion of that opinion follows.

Justice ANONYMOUS announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion with respects to Parts II, III­A, IV­D, and V­C(1), which is for the Court:

I

We are called upon to determine the constitutionality of a Kansas law that restricts specified kinds of imagistic cigarette advertising on World­Wide Web sites and other computer on­line services located within the state. Among other arguments, Petitioners maintain that such commercial expression is protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we agree and reverse the judgment of the state supreme court.

This case comes to us against the backdrop of our profound national commitment to the narrative of truth, however understood or defined, as one of the central purposes behind the First Amendment. Moreover, this narrative serves other important First Amendment values, such as the myth of the marketplace of ideas and the respectable tales of deliberative discourse, broad and fluid as those narratives must necessarily be. Those who won our independence were not openly nihilistic; they realized the importance, nay the necessity, of high­minded stories to rationalize the protection of almost any form of expression, communicative or otherwise. The civilizing force of such myths may serve to make us what we say we aspire to be. These narratives, then, inform the "analysis" that follows. . . .

We suspect that any proponent of narrative truths would hesitate to sign onto this opinion. 44 Perhaps we are wrong. If not, what does this sample opinion suggest about the character of hypocritical myth­ making? Duly mindful of motivational analysis, we wonder at what point a narrative of hypocrisy unravels into something less grandiose: a deliberate lie, perhaps? One revealing point of demarcation, it seems, would be the unwillingness of a narrator to be forthright with his or her audience. The greater this unwillingness, the greater the likelihood that hypocrisy deconstructs into lying.

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